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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
An Attack on The Optimum Marital Deduction: 
Revenue Ruling 76-176 
ARECENT development in the field of estate and gift taxation-the issuance of Revenue Ruling 
76-1561-may be an indication of a policy decision on 
the part of the Internal Revenue Service to clamp 
down on the increasing utilization of the estate plan-
ner's most flexible tool in the ·area of post-mortem 
estate planning-the disclaimer. Due to the potential 
importance of this ruling, it seems desirable ( 1 ) to 
deal with the ruling, itself, in some detail, ( 2) to see 
how the ruling might affect an estate planning con-
cept suggested in these pages last year, and ( 3) to 
determine what course of action the prudent estate 
planner might adopt now that this ruling has been 
issued. 
The Ruling 
The residuary clause of Decedent's will, admitted to 
domiciliary probate in State Yon February 28, 1974, 
provided in part as follows : 
All the residue of my estate, real and personal 
and wherever situate, I devise and bequeath 
to my issue who shall survive me, per stirpes 
and not per capita. In the event that any of 
my issue renounce his or her interest in my 
estate arising under this clause, such issue shall 
have the right to appoint all or any part of such 
interest, subject to any conditions, trusts and 
restrictions as such renouncing issue may de-
termine, to any of my issue and the spouses of 
any of my issue. Such right shall be exercised 
in writing and delivered to my executors 
within one year after the qualification of my 
executors; ... 
On February 27, 1975, Decedent's son gave the 
appropriate notice to the executors and to the probate 
court that was required in order to renounce the re-
siduary gift and to exercise the special power of 
1 I.RB. 1976-17, 22. 
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appointment in favor of a daughter-in-law and two 
grandchildren. Under the law of State Ya beneficiary 
is authorized to renounce a testamentary gift of prop-
erty and still control its disposition through the exer-
cise of a special power of appointment. Accordingly, 
the probate court of State Y accepted both the re-
nunciation and the exercise as validly made. 
The gift tax regulation2 that determines the conse-
quences of such a disclaimer reads as follows: 
The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly 
made. Thus, all transactions whereby property 
or property rights or interests are gratuitously 
passed or conferred upon another, regardless 
of the means or device employed, constitute 
gifts subject to tax. Where the law governing 
the administration of a decedent's estate gives 
a beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to 
completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept 
ownership of property trans£ erred from a de-
cedent (whether the transfer is effected by the 
decedent's will or by the law of descent and 
distribution of intestate property), a refusal 
to accept ownership does not constitute the 
making of a gift if the refusal is made within 
a reasonable time after knowledge of the exist-
ence of the transfer. The refusal must be un-
equivocable and effective under local law .... 
In any case where a refusal is purported to 
relate to only a part of the property, the de-
termination of whether or not there has been 
a complete and unqualified refusal to accept 
ownership will depend on all of the facts and 
circumstances in each particular case, taking 
into account the recognition and effectiveness 
of such a purported refusal under the local law. 
It would seem from a reading of the above regula-
tion that state law, which is referred to two separate 
times, is to be a dominant factor in measuring the 
efficacy of a disclaimer to perform its intended func-
2Reg. 25.2511-l(c). 
tion. Nevertheless, although the ruling concedes that 
the law of State Y permits the type of disclaimer op-
tion presented in the instant case and also concedes 
that the formal actions of the disclaimant complied 
with the requirements of local law, it holds that 
" ... the substance of the transaction should be gov-
erned by Federal law." Then, after a brief discussion 
of the principles contained in the first two sentences 
of the above quoted regulation, the ruling focuses 
specifically on the word "unequivocal" (sic) in the 
fourth sentence of the regulation which it interprets 
to mean "unambiguous in its consequences." The 
ruling then goes on to hold that the disclaimant made 
a taxable gift when he exercised the special power 
of appointment on the following basis: 
If a beneficiary renounces a testamentary be-
quest in the beneficiary's favor, yet directs the 
renounced bequest to certain of the natural 
objects of the beneficiary's bounty by exercis-
ing a special power of appointment which 
causes the property to be disposed of in a 
manner which is not specifically ascertainable 
from the terms of the decedent's will, then the 
beneficiary has availed himself (or herself) of 
a positive opportunity to personally effect the 
ultimate disposition of the property in which 
the beneficiary supposedly has renounced the 
ownership interest. In these circumstances, the 
act of renunciation, rather than being an act 
of singular and unambiguous import, becomes 
uncertain as an indication or sign that the 
beneficiary has completed (sic) and unquali-
fiedly refused ownership of the property given 
under the will. In effect, the beneficiary is 
making a transfer of the beneficiary's own 
property interest. The disclaimer in this case 
serves only to disguise the essence of the entire 
transaction. To ascribe independent signifi-
cance to these mutual rights and activities 
(i.e., renunciation of the absolute gift coupled 
with the grant of and the selective exercise of 
the special power of appointment) would exalt 
form over substance, and thereby defeat the 
uniform application of the revenue act by not 
taxing what is in actuality a transfer by the 
beneficiary. 
The Ruling seems to reflect a real sense of frustra-
tion on the part of the Commissioner at the "loophole" 
made available through the selective use of disclaimer 
options and to manifest an intent on his part to plug 
that hole to the extent possible-even at the cost of 
weakening the Service's credibility by the present 
overly broad and poorly reasoned ruling. In order to 
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facilitate analysis of the ruling, we might look at the 
following simple illustration of a pure disclaimer: 
A dies testate survived only a son, B, to 
whom he leaves his entire estate, and B's son 
C. Under local law, if B disclaims the testa-
mentary gift from A he will be treated as hav-
ing predeceased A with the end result that C 
will take the entirety of A's estate under the 
local "anti-lapse" statutes. 
What happens, then, when B disclaims for the sole 
purpose of causing C to take the property directly 
from A and thus avoid the gift tax that would be 
imposed if B accepted the testamentary gift and then 
made an inter-vivas transfer of the same to C? ( 1) Has 
B not "caused the property to be disposed of in a 
manner which is not specifically ascertainable from the 
terms of the decedent's will"? ( 2) Has not B "availed 
himself of a positive opportunity to personally effect 
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the ultimate disposition of the property in which (he) 
supposedly has renounced the ownership interest"? 
( 3 ) Has not B "in effect" made a transfer of his 
property to C? ( 4) Does not the disclaimer in this 
case serve "only to disguise the essence of the entire 
transaction"? ( 5) Does not ascribing independent sig-
nificance to these mutual rights and activities "exalt 
form over substance"? ( 6) Does not this disclaimer, 
if allowed, "defeat the uniform application of the 
revenue act by not taxing what is in actuality a trans-
fer by the beneficiary"? Of course all of these questions 
are answered "yes" in this case, just as they were in 
the ruling. But it is clear that B would not incur a 
gift tax liability in the hypothetical case as a result of 
his disclaimer while the disclaimant in the ruling did 
incur a gift tax liability. And these were the only 
reasons offered-except for the fact that the dis-
claimant in the ruling accepted and exercised a special 
power of appointment which, standing alone, is never 
the occasion for the imposition of a gift tax. 
It is submitted that the better view of the present 
fact situation is that the son was given two distinct 
gifts under the will-( 1) a power to draw the property 
to himself by accepting an outright gift and ( 2 ) a 
power to distribute the property among a specific 
class of beneficiaries established by the decedent-
and that he completely and unqualifiedly disclaimed 
the former and accepted and exercised the latter, as 
was expressly permitted under the law of State Y, 
which is made a primary consideration by the con-
trolling regulation. Accordingly, no gift was made as a 
consequence of the facts recited in the ruling. While 
it is true that giving tax avoidance effect to such a 
transaction does place a premium on form, it must be 
remembered that the essence of a disclaimer is the 
exaltation of form over substance in the fullest sense 
of that phrase as is demonstrated by the simple hypo-
thetical posed above. 
The Present Problem 
While the ruling may be quite wrong, one must 
recognize that it is the law of the land until such time 
as it is withdrawn by the Commissioner or overturned 
by the courts. Accordingly, it is necessary for this 
writer to refer to a plan discussed in these pages last 
year3 which is clearly in jeopardy under the present 
ruling. In discussing ways to optimize the marital 
deduction, it was suggested that one might create the 
3 Johnson, Drafting for the Optimum Marital Deduction, 
1 Va. Bar Ass'n. J. 3 (July 1975). 
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traditional two-trust marital deduction will but, in-
stead of giving the surviving spouse a general power 
of appointment over the "marital" trust and only a 
special power of appointment over the "family" trust, 
the estate planner seeking the optimum as opposed to 
the maximum marital deduction could give the surviv-
ing spouse a general power of appointment over both 
trusts. Then, after the husband's death (when the 
optimum transfer could be more accurately com-
puted), the surviving spouse could reduce the amount 
of the property passing to her for tax purposes by the 
simple means of releasing her general powers into 
special powers to the extent necessary. This would be 
accomplished by her giving up the right to appoint 
to herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors 
of her estate, while retaining the power to appoint 
to anyone else in the world. This partial release of a 
general power into a special power has been recog-
nized by statute4 in Virginia for over thirty years and 
it has been provided by statute5 for almost twenty-five 
years that if such a release is timely made it will 
operate as a disclaimer. This certainty of result under 
established state law is of small comfort, however, in 
the face of the Commissioner's present posture of 
ignoring state law under analogous circumstances in 
order to focus on the substance of the transaction 
which in turn will be "governed by Federal law." Ac-
cordingly, it would be clearly imprudent, at this time, 
to use the plan as originally described. 
A Solution to the Problem 
The present inability to follow the "optimum" plan 
as originally described, however, does not mean that 
the "optimum" plan must be abandoned. One very 
minor modification will preserve the essence of the 
plan and render it invulnerable to the Commissioner's 
attack under Rev. Rul. 76-156. One should begin 
by drafting the will exactly as described in the previous 
article, and then add the following language: 
In the event that my wife, ( X), should dis-
claim the general powers of appointment 
granted her in Article .... , above, either as to 
all of my estate or to any portion thereof, then, 
as to such property over which the general 
power has been so disclaimed, I give the XYZ 
(Continued on page 22) 
4 Va. Code Ann. Section 55-279(2) (b) (Rep!. vol. 1974). 
5 Va. Code Ann. Section 55-286.1 (Rep!. vol. 1974). 
Revenue Ruling 7 6-156 
(Continued from page 12) 
Bank6 a special power of appointment exer-
cisable among such of my kindred and spouses 
of my kindred as the XYZ Bank in the sole ex-
ercise of its absolute discretion shall determine 
to be best in the light of circumstances existing 
at the time of such exercise. The special power 
of appointment herein given to the XYZ 
Bank may be exercised at any time or times 
during my said wife's lifetime and must be 
exercised no later than -----·--·-·----·----7 following 
the death of my said wife. To the extent that 
the power is not validly exercised within _______ _ 
following the death of my said wife, the corpus 
then remaining shall be distributed, per stirpes, 
among my then surviving issue.8 
It is anticipated that the XYZ Bank, though having 
absolute power over the appointments to be made, 
will not be unmindful of such advice as the surviving 
spouse may choose to offer concerning to whom ap-
pointments should be made and how much should be 
6 This would normally be the corporate fiduciary, but it 
would not have to be so. 
7 One must pick a time not exceeding twenty-one years in 
order to not violate the Rule against Perpetuities. If a long 
period is used, some attention must be given to the disposition 
of the income from the appointive property in the interim. 
s Any time a power of appointment is used, the governing 
instrument should provide what limitations will or will not 
apply to the donee's power, e.g., to appoint in trust, to create 
life estates and remainders, to impose spendthrift restrictions, 
etc. 
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set off to the various appointees.9 Accordingly, the 
shift of the actual decision making power to the cor-
porate fiduciary, in the legal sense, will not operate to 
weaken the surviving spouse's potential to affect the 
ultimate disposition of the property in the ordinary 
case. But, since the surviving spouse will be merely 
offering advice to the bank, as opposed to exercising 
the power herself, it is clear that no adverse gift tax 
consequences will arise under Rev. Rul. 76-156. 
In the event that it is not practicable to redraft an 
existing document that has been drawn along the lines 
of the original plan, the indicated course of action at 
the husband's death (assuming the ruling is still in 
effect) would be to determine the optimum transfer as 
per the original plan and then to disclaim the general 
power of appointment over the surplus absolutely (as 
opposed to releasing it into a special power) . This will 
result in the remainder interest in the disclaimed por-
tion passing to the takers in default (typically the 
children) in equal shares after the death of the sur-
viving spouse, and leave the surviving spouse in a 
position to make any desirable adjustments through 
the exercise of her general power of appointment. 
The ease with which the ruling can be out-flanked 
is believed to be further evidence of its unsoundness 
and it is hoped that the Commissioner will withdraw 
the ruling in the near future. In such event, a notice 
to that effect will appear in these pages. 
9 One could also add precatory language such as "I request 
but do not require that the XYZ Bank, in the exercise of its 
power, be guided by the wishes of my wife, (X) ." This would 
seem to be not only unnecessary but also to border on waving 
a red flag, and thus undesirable. 
